The Internet has transformed the nature of business-to-consumer transaction-making practices in many industries. Sellers now attract customers with innovative Internet-based selling mechanisms that can reveal or conceal market information. We define market transparency as a design dimension for Internetbased selling that involves firm choices about the level of availability and accessibility of information about products and prices. Firms can influence market transparency either by designing and implementing their own Internet-based selling mechanism, or by offering their products through an existing electronic market. We develop an economic model of a supplier that price discriminates across distribution channels based on their market transparency levels. The model provides normative guidelines for firms to set transparency levels and prices across distribution channels in order to maximize profits. We empirically evaluate airline pricing and market transparency to show the applicability of these guidelines. The evidence suggests that relative prices and transparency levels across the Internet and traditional air travel channels are sub-optimal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet technologies have brought about significant changes to market transparency in business-toconsumer (B2C) markets. To the benefit of consumers, it has reduced search costs for information about products and prices. And sellers now attract customers with innovative selling mechanisms that can reveal or conceal market information. Today, organizations are faced with the paradox that the very benefit of the Internet-making information available to facilitate product marketing and distribution-also makes it difficult to capture profits (Porter, 2001) . Market transparency, the selective revelation of product and price information, is now a design variable in Internet-based selling mechanisms, and it is increasingly viewed strategically by firms as they consider the trade-off between attracting consumers with market information and the risks of losing information advantages (Tapscott and Ticoll, 2003) .
In the air travel industry, some major airlines have taken advantage of the Internet to develop innovative and transparent mechanisms. For example, in 2001 five major U.S. airlines introduced Orbitz (www.orbitz.com), an online travel agency (OTA) that displays a wide range of travel options based on combinations of airline carrier, flight schedules, travel dates, and price. On the other hand, some OTAs exhibit opaque selling mechanisms that conceal product or price information until after purchase (e.g., www.priceline.com). Meanwhile, traditional travel agencies continue to play a significant role in Internetbased air travel distribution.
In this paper, we model the impact of information transparency on consumers' economic behavior and derive optimal transparency levels and prices across channels that a supplier should adopt to maximize profits. Using the guidelines from the model, we analyze a large data set of airline tickets to evaluate transparency levels and prices in air travel.
II. IT AND MARKET TRANSPARENCY IN B2C MARKETS
We define market transparency as the level of availability and accessibility of market information. A firm can design its market transparency by implementing selling mechanisms with a desired transparency level, or by joining an electronic market that meets certain transparency requirements. We focus on two design dimensions of market transparency: product and price transparency. Product transparency exists when product information and characteristics are visible to consumers. Price transparency exists when market prices and related information are visible, such as quotes and transaction prices. A more transparent mechanism will result from greater transparency in either dimension.
Internet-based sellers can compete by selecting a transparency tuple, [Product Information Available, Price Information Available] in the space of possible alternatives. For example, OTAs have adopted different combinations of product and price transparency with the support of IT-enabled selling mechanisms (Granados, et al., 2005 (Granados, et al., , 2006 . (See Figure 1. ) Orbitz, Expedia, and Travelocity offer multiple itineraries with the respective prices, although Orbitz has state-of-the-art technology and special agreements with its suppliers to show more priced itineraries in Figure 1 Orbitz nnel distribution strategy. They can sell products through channels with different levels of transparency, and travelers w differ in their valuation of information regarding products and prices. More generally, how should suppliers strategize in a market with heterogeneous transparency levels? We answer t question by modeling supplier decisions about pricing and transparency levels across distribution channels.
I
We now summarize the results of a model of transparency choice. It characterizes scenar e competitive environment of the Internet where there is no pre-existing market-wide level of transparency. In this model, a firm (e.g., an airline) makes choices regarding transparency and price channel. This set of choices constitutes a transparency strategy, which can be implemented due to the advancement of Web-based technologies. In the interest of tractability of our model and the developme of practical guidelines, we derive optimal relative transparency levels and prices across channels.
A. Profit Model
Consider a mar and of the form 
, where C(x) is the cost al costs are constant and do not differ across ch function. We assume that margin annels, so 
The profit maximizing prices are characterized by the equation uidelines. The p de a theoretical optimal relationship between transparency levels and prices across channels. But in practice this optimal relationship is difficult to derive, because it depends on prior knowledge of transparency's impact on WTP, 0 α and 1 α . We now enhance the model by deriving optimal prices and transparency levels based on historical ales by channel. For clarity of exposition, in this sub-section we assume that market transparency decreases WTP. Let 
Corollary (The Optimal Price Ratio):
The optimal price ct ratio is a fun ion of the channel share opt ratio. However, if the relative transparency levels and prices are not optimal, channel shares will not be imal. In a sense, by selecting a transparency level, sellers indirectly set the base demand for the product, so any attempt by a supplier to artificially increase or decrease sales through a channel with prices will be sub-optimal. Next, we characterize these general findings in terms of each possible scenario of the impact of transparency on demand. (See Figure 2 again price ratio will equal the optimal channel share rati s corollary suggests that if relative shares are not equal to relative prices in a market with lin and, prices or transparency levels should be adjusted to Case 2: Price Elasticity Scenario. In some situations, transparency may have an impact on sensitivity to prices for existing customers. Assuming there is no impact on the b owing proposition characterizes optimal prices and channel shares: Proposition 4 (The Price Elasticity Effect Proposition): If the supplier sets prices by channel to maximize revenue, both channels will have an equal sha 1 * = S . This proposition suggests that the firm should price such that each channel has equal sal me. For example, if the firm observes that the channel T's sales are lower than chann s s S < 1, then it should either decrease the transparency level of channel T, increase the transp level of channel O, or increase the price differential between the channels to maximize revenue.
Case 3: Mixed Effect Scenario. If the relative transparency levels differ significantly between two channels, transparency is likely to affect both base demand and price elasticity of demand. We su implications for optimal prices and channel shares with: Proposition 5 (The Mixed Effects Proposition): If the supplier sets prices by channel to maximize revenue, the price differential between channel demand scenario. This proposition suggests that the mixed effect of market information on base demand and ticity compounds th elines from the base demand scenario should be applied, but to a larger extent.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARKET TRANSPARENCY IN AIR TRAVEL
We evaluated U.S. airlines' transparency strategy in online (i.e., transparent OTA such as Or Travelocity, and Expedia) and offline (i.e., traditional travel agencies) channels using a da ets sold by travel agencies through global distribution systems (GDSs) between September 2003 an August 2004. The database contains information on 3 million economy class tickets sold in 210 U.S. point-of-sale city pairs, aggregated by agency type and destination region (i.e., domestic and Europe). This aggregation level results in a broad measure of the average fare for all airlines, or an estimate of industry level fares by channel.
The average one-way price of tickets sold offline was $248, compared to $143 for tickets sold onli This price differential is consistent with our Transparency Strategy Proposition, which suggests that airlines should price discriminate in these channels because they have different transparency levels. We now assess whether the relative transparency levels and prices across these channels are optimal.
We used the demand model, (std. error = 0.001, p = 0.00 gests that the air travel demand ). ith thi timate of θ we now evaluate airline transparency strategy for eac , so transparency decreases base demand but it does not affect price elasticity. Referring onclude that the online travel channel has a higher ditional travel agencies. We estimated the price elasticity by channel based Tickets sold Fitted Curve ore transparent online channel is lower than in the offline channel. However, this result cannot be fully attributed to transparency, because o also incorporates all other channel-specific effects such as quality of servic the following analysis, we use historical sales by channel and guidelines from the model to assess whether air travel transparency strategy is optimal across distribution channe
A. Base Demand Analysis
The estimate of θ is 0. . On the other hand, the observed channel share ratio is S = 0.28, so S P > θ , which suggests the transparency strategy is sub-optimal. However, the observed channel shares may be uch as the maturity of the Internet channel and structural differences in e quality and convenience. Therefore, we adjusted the channel share ratio using the estimated channel effect, or the coefficient of o, which led to an adjusted S = 0.45. Since this observed channel effect includes the effect of market transparency, S is over-adjusted, yet the inequality S P > θ remains, so airline transparency strategy is sub-optimal. Therefore, airlines can increase revenues by either decreasing the transparency level of their OTA channels, or by increasing the price differ between channels that satisfy the condition
B. Price Elasticity Analysis
We analyzed price elasticities by channel. We c affected by other factors s servic ential price elasticity compared to tra on a log-linear demand model,
, where -η is the price elasticity and i ∈ {online, offline}. Applying the log transformation results in a linear equation. These demand functions by channel represent a system of equations which hav et of error terms since the demands are determined in the same market context and period. Therefore, we used seemingly unrelated regressions to estimate the system of equations. The offline and online price elasticity estimates (i.e., the coefficients of ) ln( i p ) w e a linked s Por Revolutionize e elasticity analysis suggests that air travel transparen rategy is sub-optimal, and airlines should decrease the transparency level of the online OTA channel or increase the price differential across chann until their sales are equal.
C. Mixed Effects Analysis
From the base demand base demand but a higher pric ario and price elasticity scenario analyses suggest that the offline channel may be sub-optimally cannibalizing travelers from the online channel. Given the observed mixed effect of transparency on consumers, airlines should decrease the transparency of their Internet-based selling mechanisms or increase the price differential between traditional and Internet channels to a larger extent than what th guidelines of the base demand and price elasticity scenarios suggest.
V. CONCLUSIONS
market presence, posit ti-channel transparency strategy where technology and transparency levels differ across sales channels. We found that multi-channel transparency strategy may be sub-optimal in the air travel industr and provided recommendations on how airlines can increase revenues.
The model is based on reasonably general assumptions regarding the impact of market transparency on willingness-to-pay. It is attractive because it provides guidelines based on observed historical sales by channel for a firm to diagnose whether its multi-channel transparency strategy is sub-optimal, and the directional corrective actions that need to be taken. Our analysis of the air travel industry shows how the model can be used to make such a diagnosis, despite no prior knowledge of the impact of transparency. We have empirical research underway to examine the influence of product and price transparency on consumer demand, which will inform this model and the guidelines it yields.
Our model is particularly useful for firms that have a captive market where the valuation of market transparency may differ among the consumers. As sellers manipulate market i some multi-channel shoppers may switch to a different channel, and others may not switch yet become more sensitive to prices. With the normative guidelines that we have derived, firms can make sound decisions when confronted with this problem in an environment where technological capabilities allow them to price-discriminate and set transparency levels by channel.
